What Determines Australia's Foreign Equity Investment? by Pendle, Lara
 i 
 
 
 
 
WHAT DETERMINES AUSTRALIA’S FOREIGN 
EQUITY INVESTMENT? 
 
 
Minor thesis submitted in partial fulfilment for Honours in the  
B. Commerce 
University of Sydney 
October 2007 
 
 
By Lara Pendle 
Supervised by Dr. David Kim
 ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I wish to thank my supervisor, Dr. David Kim for his encouragement, sound 
advice, good teaching and lots of good ideas. Thank you also to my family and 
Daniel Elder for their support and understanding. Final thanks to my fellow 
honours peers for the much needed inspiration and motivation during this long 
year. 
 iii 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
In light of the recent changes to superannuation legislation in Australia, the 
corresponding heightened exposure to equity markets has highlighted the 
importance of portfolio diversification as a means to reduce income risk. The 
International Capital Asset Pricing Model of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner 
(1965) suggests that in order to obtain maximum gains from diversification, 
investors should hold the world market portfolio. However, empirical 
evidence suggests that investors hold too little wealth in foreign assets. This 
large discrepancy between theory and data is known as the home bias puzzle 
and still remains robust despite the recent liberalisation of financial markets 
and removals of direct barriers to investment.  
This thesis empirically investigates the distribution of Australian holdings of 
foreign equities and considers the determinants of equity home bias for a 
sample of 25 countries. The IMF’s high quality Coordinated Portfolio 
Investment Survey (CPIS) dataset is appropriate for this purpose and is 
utilised over the period 2001 to 2005. The key findings are that indirect 
barriers to international investment and information costs are important 
factors behind international investment patterns and the home bias puzzle.  
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
In light of the recent changes to superannuation legislation, Australian 
households are dedicating a growing proportion of their household wealth 
to equity. Between 1990 and 2005, Australian direct equity holdings as a 
share of total household assets increased from four per cent to seven 
per cent and superannuation assets increased from 17 per cent to 20 
per cent.1 This heightened exposure to equity markets, both directly and 
indirectly, has highlighted the importance of portfolio diversification as a 
means to reduce income risks.  
The international capital asset pricing model (ICAPM) of Sharpe (1964) 
and Lintner (1965) suggests that under assumptions of perfect markets, 
mean-variance optimising investors can obtain maximum gains from 
diversification by holding the world market portfolio. However, empirical 
evidence suggests that investors hold too little of their wealth in foreign 
assets and are biased towards domestic assets (notably French and 
Poterba (1991) and Tesar and Werner (1995)). This phenomenon is 
known as the “home-bias puzzle”. The existence of home bias implies that 
investors may be irrational when they forgo gains from diversification. 
However, the underweighting of foreign assets may be due to rational 
reasons such as direct and indirect barriers to investment.   
Over the last couple of decades, investors have seen a considerable 
decrease in direct obstacles to international portfolio investment. Twenty 
to thirty years ago most countries had restrictions on foreign exchange 
                                      
1 http://www.rba.gov.au/Statistics/Bulletin/B20hist.xls 
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transactions that limited cross-border investment. Global integration of 
financial markets has seen most investment barriers and capital controls 
diminished, thereby increasing the opportunities to engage in 
international diversification. However, despite the fact that direct barriers 
to international investment have fallen dramatically, foreign ownership is 
still much smaller than one would expect in the absence of such barriers.  
Numerous explanations have been offered for the determinants of 
international portfolio choice and home bias. Among others they include 
diversification motives for hedging country specific risk, the existence of 
transaction costs for buying and selling securities and information 
asymmetries. However, existing empirical works have been impeded by 
the problem of accurately estimating bilateral equity holdings, which are 
stock measures. Instead, data on accumulated capital flows was used to 
estimate cross border holdings. This data is of poor quality and ill suited 
to estimate bilateral equity holdings (see Tesar and Werner (1995) and 
Warnock and Cleaver (2002)). This thesis will contribute to the existing 
literature by employing the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF’s) 
Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) dataset on bilateral 
equity holdings for the years 2001 to 2005. This dataset is considered to 
be of high quality and measures stock holdings of bilateral investment 
positions.2   
In addition, the thesis contributes to the current empirical literature by 
providing a country specific analysis of equity investment from the 
perspective of an Australian investor. Although Mishra and Daly (2006) 
                                      
2A full explanation on the benefits of the CPIS dataset is discussed in Chapter IV. 
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conducted a similar study on the geography of Australia’s international 
portfolio investment, their work was limited by the CPIS dataset for 1997 
and 2001. Moreover, the thesis will investigate not only the geography of 
equity holdings but also the determinants of a measure of home-bias.  
Home bias is measured as the deviation of equity holdings from CAPM 
benchmark and is in accordance with Ahearne et al (2004).3  
The structure of this thesis will be as follows: Chapter II will provide an 
overview of the literature on foreign investment and the home bias 
puzzle. Chapter III presents two theoretical models on investor behaviour 
and a definition of home bias. The first model is the international CAPM of 
Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) and the second model by Martin and 
Rey (2004) incorporates transaction costs and information asymmetries 
to derive a gravity model of international portfolio holdings. Chapter IV 
describes the data used in the estimations. Chapter V reports results for 
the empirical estimations of equity holdings and home bias and Chapter 
VI concludes 
                                      
3 A full description of the home bias measure is provided in Chapter III. 
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CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Economists have been trying to explain the geographical location of equity 
investment for several decades. The finance and macroeconomic 
literature both provide explanations for theoretically optimal allocations of 
equities across countries and refer to actual deviations from these 
benchmarks as the home bias puzzle.  
In the finance literature the traditional international capital asset pricing 
model (ICAPM) based on Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) provides a 
highly simplified model to explain portfolio diversification across borders. 
The assumptions underlying this model can be summarised as; (i) 
investors are risk averse, (ii) they make decisions based on expected 
returns and the variances of asset returns, (iii) a risk free asset exists 
where investors can lend or borrow at the same rate, (iv) capital markets 
are perfect and (v) there are no transaction costs. Under these restrictive 
assumptions, mean-variance optimising investors can obtain maximum 
gains from diversification by holding the equities of countries whose 
returns are negatively correlated with the returns of the home country 
equities. In order to maximise these gains; the ICAPM proposes that 
investors hold equities in the proportions that they exist in the market, 
i.e.: the market portfolio. However, investors appear to fail drastically in 
obtaining diversified portfolios and tend to heavily over-invest in domestic 
stocks.  
The macroeconomic literature on international risk sharing comes to a 
similar conclusion. Under the assumptions of complete markets, isoelastic 
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utilities and the availability of international Arrow-Debreu securities, the 
ex post marginal rates of substitution in consumption should be equal for 
residents in different countries. This means that individuals in each 
country should share risk from their country specific production processes 
by holding securities that pay out claims against each other’s profits. In a 
world economy with complete markets, these claims represent Arrow-
Debreu securities that will pay out under all possible states of production 
outcomes. In equilibrium, agents from different countries will equalise 
their marginal utilities for each state of production outcomes. Risk sharing 
implies that the growth rates of consumption should be equalised across 
production states and countries. Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992) found 
that while the standard general equilibrium theory predicts a highly, if not 
perfect, correlated consumption growth across countries, the growth rates 
of consumption across countries are not highly correlated in data.  In fact, 
they are even less correlated than the growth rates of output across 
countries. This implies that if investors do not hold enough claims on 
foreign assets, they will be unsuccessful in sharing risk with foreigners. 
Lewis (1999) claims that although international portfolio diversification 
and international risk-sharing are closely related they are not necessarily 
equivalent phenomena. Deviations from the market portfolio as studied in 
the finance literature is known as the “equity home bias”, while 
departures from income and consumption smoothing are known in the 
international macroeconomic literature as the “international risk-sharing 
puzzle”. Although these two concepts are closely related, one does not 
necessarily imply the other. For example, home bias may not lead to a 
lack of international risk sharing if consumption and income smoothing is 
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done through international borrowing and lending rather than through a 
fully diversified portfolio.  This implies that the intertemporal efficiency 
condition as shown by the consumption Euler equation can still hold even 
without a fully diversified portfolio. Conversely, Baxter and Jermann 
(1997) show that even if investors hold completely diversified portfolios, it 
will not directly imply that income and consumption streams are smooth. 
This could be because global equity holdings may be too small relative to 
global GDP or because equities may be poor at providing a hedge for 
returns of human capital. The strong link between these two puzzles is 
heavily reliant on assumptions about the economy including complete 
markets, equity is traded on all output and that countries can be viewed 
as populated by representative agents. Because the association is weak, 
this thesis will focus on examining international portfolio diversification 
and the equity home bias puzzle. 
II.1 DIRECT BARRIERS TO INVESTMENT 
The earlier literature on international investment and equity home bias 
focused on the role of barriers to international investment. Black (1974) 
developed a two-country model of capital market equilibrium where there 
are explicit barriers to cross border investment. Barriers are measured in 
the form of a tax where this tax could represent various kinds of barriers 
such as direct controls on the movement of capital, possibility of 
expropriation by foreigners, reserve requirements on bank deposits and 
restrictions on the fraction of a business that can be foreign-owned. 
However, Tesar and Werner (1995) propose that if transaction costs are 
important, investors should be observed to follow buy-and-hold 
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strategies. On the contrary, they found a high turnover rate on foreign 
investments, suggesting that investors frequently adjust the size of their 
international portfolios. This rules out nominal transaction costs of 
international trading as the cause of the failure of investors to diversify 
their portfolios. 
II.2 INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES 
However, transaction costs may be in the more subtle form of information 
asymmetries. Investors are likely to invest in firms that are familiar to 
them thus providing a rational explanation for home bias. French and 
Poterba (1991) use a simple model of investor preference and behaviour 
to demonstrate that information asymmetry could explain the same 
observed magnitude of home bias as if the investors expect returns in the 
domestic market to be several hundred basis points higher than returns 
on other markets. Gehrig (1993) employs a simple noisy rational 
expectations model where investors are imperfectly informed and 
information asymmetries exist between domestic and foreign investors. 
Investors observe noisy signals with different degrees of precision and 
domestic investors receive signals about future returns that are more 
precise. He shows that the domestic bias arises quite naturally when 
investors have better information about domestic stocks and thus foreign 
stocks appear, on average, more risky. Hasan and Simaan (2000) 
calculate the premium that uninformed investors are willing to pay for the 
full information set. They show that rational investors will prefer the home 
country portfolio over the diversified portfolio when the cross-market 
variability in the estimation errors of international markets’ means far 
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exceeds the cross-market variability in the means themselves. Lane 
(2000) finds that trade and the market size are strongly correlated with 
gross international investment positions. It seems probable that those 
factors that influence trade in goods also stimulate trade in assets. Hence 
trade could be used as a proxy for information asymmetries. Portes, Rey 
and Oh (2001) show that a gravity model, where distance is used as a 
proxy for information, explains the international asset trade of US 
investment just as well as trade in goods does. Countries which are near 
each other tend to have better knowledge about each other, either 
because of better media coverage or better tourist and business links. 
However, at the time of writing, their paper did not have access to the 
comprehensive Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) dataset, 
which measures the stock of cross border equity holdings.4 Instead, it had 
to use inferior bilateral flow data from the US treasury TIC data. These 
studies suggest that asymmetric information between local and non-local 
investors may play an important role in investment decision making.  
II.3 CULTURAL LINKS AND INSTITUTIONS 
Several authors examined cultural proximity of countries and equity 
investment. In Finland, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) show that 
language is relevant for an investor’s portfolio allocation. Finnish investors 
whose native language is Swedish are more likely to own stocks of 
companies in Finland that have annual reports in Swedish and whose 
CEOs speak Swedish than those investors whose native language is 
Finnish. Choe, Kho and Stulz (2001) find that, in Korea, foreign investors 
                                      
4 A full explanation on the benefits of the CPIS dataset is discussed in Chapter IV. 
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buy at higher prices than residents and sell at lower prices. Hau (2001) 
finds that proprietary trades on the German stock market do better when 
they are geographically closer to Frankfurt. Dahlquist et al (2003) show 
that differences in corporate governance across countries can help explain 
home bias through their impact on share ownership. They construct an 
estimate of the world float portfolio, which is the market portfolio 
excluding shares held by investors who are controlling shareholders. This 
is because these shares cannot easily be bought by portfolio investors and 
therefore should not be included in the world market portfolio. They find 
evidence to suggest that United States investors underweight those 
foreign countries in their portfolios which have closely held firms. 
II.4 COUNTRY SPECIFIC STUDIES 
Several papers investigate the home bias puzzle related to individual 
countries. Kang and Stulz (1997) investigate the foreign portfolio equity 
ownership in Japan. They find that foreign investors overweight shares in 
firms in manufacturing industries, large firms, firms with good accounting 
performance, firms with low unsystematic risk and firms with low levels of 
debt. A study into the determinants of the geographic location of United 
States equity investment was conducted by Ahearne et al (2004). They 
found evidence to suggest that an indirect barrier to investment, 
information costs, plays an important role in the home  
bias phenomenon. The percentage of a country’s market  
capitalisation that was listed on a US exchange was used as a proxy  
for information costs. This is because, in order to list, firms  
have to comply with the SEC disclosure requirements and  
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subject themselves to the strict regulatory environment. Those  
countries that had a larger share of firms listed on a United States  
stock exchange were found to be less severely underweighted  
in US equity portfolios. They also found results to suggest  
that when direct barriers to investment, such as capital  
controls and transaction costs, are statistically significant their  
economic importance is small. Furthermore, they highlighted  
that firms from countries with low accounting standards or high  
trading costs can improve their prospects with US investors by  
listing on a US exchange. Mishra & Daly (2006) empirically  
examine Australia’s international investment patterns. They  
use the IMF’s CPIS for the years 1997 and 2001 and examine  
which bilateral factors are responsible for explaining the geography of 
Australia’s equity investment patterns over the sample period. They find 
that the trade position and size of the market are both highly significant 
in explaining portfolio allocation. Additional variables that are proxies for 
information quality and the regulatory environment also possess 
substantial explanatory power. These variables include telephone costs, 
language dummy, efficiency of the judicial system and accounting 
standards.  
This thesis extends the work of Mishra & Daly (2006) by employing the 
latest CPIS figures from the IMF in order to provide an explanation of 
Australian international investment patterns for the period 2001-2005. A 
further contribution of this thesis is that it investigates the empirical 
determinants of the degree of home bias found in Australian equity 
portfolios.
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CHAPTER III: THEORETICAL MODELS 
III.1 THE INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL 
Pioneered by Harry Markowitz (1952) and extended to an international 
framework by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965), the international CAPM 
provides a basic benchmark model for investment and portfolio theory. It 
introduced the concept that a portfolio of risky assets must be broadly 
diversified in order to be efficient. The underlying behavioural 
assumptions and main conclusions are presented below.  
The theory assumes the following; agents are risk averse, utility 
maximising investors care only about mean return and variance of return 
of their portfolios. In addition, they have homogenous expectations about 
returns and variance of returns. This means that all investors agree on 
the joint distribution of asset returns between time periods and that this 
distribution is the true one. Furthermore, capital markets are complete 
which implies that taxes and transaction costs do not exist and investors 
can borrow and lend infinitely at the risk free rate. 
Figure 1 describes the portfolio opportunities under the assumptions of 
the international CAPM. The diagram plots expected return of the portfolio 
against portfolio risk, measured by the standard deviation of portfolio 
return. The curve ‘abc’ is the minimum variance frontier. This traces 
combinations of expected return and risk, as measured by its variance, 
for portfolios of risky assets that minimise the variance of returns for 
given levels of expected return. If there is no risk free asset, only 
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portfolios on the ‘ab’ segment are mean-variance-efficient. That is, they 
provide maximum expected returns for a given level of risk.  
The efficient set is turned into a straight line upon the inclusion of a risk-
free asset. Imagine a portfolio that invests a proportion x of funds in the 
risk free security and 1-x in some portfolio g. All possible combinations of 
g and risk-free lending plot on the straight line between Rf and g. Points 
to the right of g correspond to risk-free borrowing where proceeds are 
used to invest further in portfolio g. In short, portfolios that combine risk-
free lending or borrowing with a risky portfolio g, plot along a straight line 
from Rf through g in Figure 1. 
So, to obtain the mean-variance-efficient frontier incorporating a risk free 
asset one plots a line through Rf tangential to the minimum variance 
frontier for risky assets. Therefore, all efficient portfolios are combinations 
of the risk-free asset (either borrowing or lending) and a single tangency 
portfolio T. Under complete agreement between investors about portfolio 
returns and risk, all investors see the same opportunity set and combine 
the same portfolio T with the risk-free asset. Since all investors hold the 
same portfolio, it must be the market portfolio. That is, each asset in the 
market portfolio is weighted by the total market value of all outstanding 
units of the asset, divided by the total market value of all risky assets.  
The international CAPM can be applied to the Australian perspective quite 
simply. Consider Figure 2 which illustrates the efficient frontier facing 
Australian investors. This figure plots the mean and standard deviations of 
annualised monthly returns from January 1990 to December 2000 for 
different combination portfolios of Australian and foreign equities. The 
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Australian portfolio is represented by the S&P/ASX All Ordinaries Index 
and the foreign portfolio by the Australian dollar value of the MSCI World 
Index excluding Australia. Although this highly simplified efficient frontier 
fails to take into account how different compositions of the components of 
the two indices would change the risk return combination of the portfolio, 
basic conclusions regarding the optimal portfolio can be drawn. In 
particular, if investors prefer higher returns to lower returns, point C is 
strictly preferred to the portfolio comprising 100% Australian stocks. Also, 
if investors prefer lower risk to higher risk, the minimum variance 
portfolio at B is strictly preferred to the Australian portfolio alone. This 
implies that all points between B and C also strictly dominate the 100 
per cent Australian Portfolio. However, if we assume an 80 percent 
holding in domestic equities, as calculated from CPIS data (Table 1 and 
Table 2) this would imply that Australian investors currently face the risk-
return profile of portfolio A. Clearly, this portfolio is suboptimal for any set 
of preferences. 
However, what the basic international CAPM fails to consider is the effect 
of high transaction costs. In particular, the effect that they have on 
expected returns and on the perceived riskiness of the stocks when the 
full information set is not made available to all investors.  
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Figure 1:  Optimal Portfolio under  
Standard Portfolio Theory 
 
Note:  
Figure 1 plots the expected returns of a portfolio against the standard deviation 
of those returns. Segment ‘abc’: the minimum variance frontier, Segment ‘ab’: 
mean-variance efficient frontier, Point b: the minimum variance portfolio, Rf: the 
risk free asset, Point T: the tangency portfolio or market portfolio. The mean-
variance efficient frontier incorporating a risk free asset is the line through Rf 
and T.  
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Figure 2: Risk-Return Trade-off Portfolios  
of Australian and Foreign Equities, 1990-2000 
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Note: 
The risk-return profile of the 100 per cent Australian portfolio was calculated 
from the S&P/ASX All Ordinaries Index. The Foreign portfolio was calculated 
from the MSCI World Index excluding Australia. Data was taken from 
January 1990 to December 2000. Point A represents the risk-return profile of 
the portfolio that is 80 per cent Australian and 20 per cent foreign. Point B is 
the minimum variance portfolio. Point C is the portfolio with the same risk as 
the 100 per cent Australian portfolio but higher average returns.   
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III.2 THE GRAVITY MODEL OF INTERNATIONAL PORTFOLIO 
HOLDINGS  
To address the issue of transaction costs, the thesis follows the theoretical 
framework of Martin and Rey (2004), extended from two countries to N 
countries by Faruqee, Li and Yan (2004). In this model international 
financial asset holdings follow a gravity equation, augmented by 
transaction costs. They find that a gravity type equation emerges quite 
naturally from a model for international trade provided that the following 
assumptions hold. First, assets insure against different risks and are thus 
imperfect substitutes. Secondly, engaging in cross border asset trade 
entails some type of transaction cost. This transaction cost could 
potentially exist in the form of information asymmetries.  
The theoretical model takes the following general framework. N countries 
are each populated with ni risk averse, immobile identical agents. In the 
first period, each agent hi {1,..., }in∈  in country i is endowed with a risky 
project 
ih
x and y units of a freely traded good which they can choose to 
consume, invest in risky projects or use to buy shares on the stock 
market. In the second period there are S exogenously determined and 
equally likely states of nature. The risky project is an Arrow-Debreu 
security which pays dividends of 
iij h
dδ in state j, j {1,..., }S∈  where 
 ijδ =1 if i=j and ijδ =0 if i j≠ . This assumption captures the feature that 
the risky projects and assets are different and imperfectly correlated so 
assets are imperfect substitutes and diversification improves safety. 
These dividends are the only source of consumption in the second period. 
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In the first period shares in these projects are traded on the stock 
market. This implies that investing in one of these projects is equivalent 
to buying an Arrow-Debreu asset that yields a dividend payoff in only one 
state of nature. This generates strong incentives to diversify. However, it 
is assumed that the total number of projects in the world, T, is less than 
the number of states, S, so markets are incomplete and agents cannot 
completely eliminate all risk by holding a portfolio of all traded assets (the 
market portfolio).  
Transaction costs 
In the first period, agents raise capital by selling shares of their projects 
and buying shares of other projects. This transaction cost is paid in units 
of the share itself and can represent banking commissions and variable 
fees, exchange rate transaction costs and information costs.  
Transaction costs are modelled so that buyers of the assets bear the 
transaction cost (the results are the same regardless of whether the 
buyer or seller bears the cost). In this case, the amount paid by an agent 
hi, located in country i, in period 1 to buy j
i
h
hx  asset sold in country j is 
(1 )j
i
h j
j h ip x + τ  where pj is the price of a share of the risky project 
developed by agent hj and 
j
iτ  is the transaction cost in asset markets 
between countries i and j. In period 2, a transportation cost ijψ  is applied 
to the dividend payment. If an agent in country i holds an asset in country 
j which pays a dividend of dj in period 2, the shareholder in country i will 
only receive (1- ijψ )dj per share.  
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Budget Constraint 
An agent hi in country i has the following budget constraint: 
1,
1
(1 )
i i i
N
j j
h i j j h h
j
c n p x y p
=
+ + τ = +∑  
where jiτ >0 if j ≠ i and jiτ =0 if j=i. Each agent maximises the following 
utility function: 
1
1 1 /
1, 2,
,...,
[ /(1 1/ )]
h h i i iN
h hi i
h h h
x x
Max U c E c − σ= + β − σ   
σ is the inverse of the degree of risk aversion and also the elasticity of 
substitution between assets.  
Solving the first order conditions and market clearing conditions yields 
cross-border equity holdings jiEQ  from i to j. 
1 1(1 )
(1 )
j
jj i
i i j j j
j i
d
EQ nn p
T p
σ σ− σ−
σ σ
− ψβ⎛ ⎞=  ⎜ ⎟ + τ⎝ ⎠  
1 1( )( )( )( )j ji i j i j
i j
EQ MCP MCP TC RET
T p p
σ
σ−β⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  (1) 
 
where 1(1 ) /(1 )j j ji i iTC
σ− σ= − ψ + τ  is the international transaction cost and 
/j j jRET d p=  is the rate of return. iMCP  and jMCP are the market 
capitalisation of country i and j respectively and pi, pj measure the prices 
of assets in countries i and j respectively. This model generates the basic 
gravity model of cross-border portfolio holdings. International equity 
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holdings should be positively related with the size of the markets in both 
countries, negatively correlated with transaction costs and there is return 
chasing behaviour. Through some simple algebraic manipulation it is 
possible to obtain the following equations, which are equivalent to 
equation (1). 
σ
σ-1β ( )( )j ji i j i jEQ n n TC RETT
⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  (2) 
 
j j
ji i
j j
j i j
ps TC
s p TC
=  (3) 
 
j j
j ji i
j j
j i j i
RET ds TC
s RET TC d
=  (4) 
 
where jis is the share of country i’s portfolio consisting in country j’s 
equity, which is equal to /( )ji iEQ MCP . Because this study takes an 
Australian perspective the subscript i will be dropped as it will denote 
Australia, and country j will denote the destination country of investment.  
A Measure of Home Bias 
Home bias is taken from Ahearne et al (2004) to be a measure of the 
deviation of equity holdings from the international CAPM benchmark. It is 
defined as one minus the ratio of the shares of country j equities in the 
Australian and world portfolios. This measure varies from zero (if the 
weight on foreign equities is the same as their benchmark) to one (if no 
foreign equities are held) 
       
 1
       
j share of country j equities at domestic levelHome Bias
share of country j equities in world portfolio
= −  
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By substituting this measure into equation (4) and rearranging, then 
according to the gravity model of Martin and Rey (1999), the measure of 
home bias should be negatively related to returns and dividends and 
positively related to transaction costs. 
1 1
j j
j ji i
j j
w i j i
RET ds TC
s RET TC d
− = −  (5) 
 
The empirical section of the thesis investigates the geographical pattern 
of equity the Australian foreign equity portfolio in order to explain the 
distribution of the measure of Australian investors’ home bias across 
countries. In particular, this thesis will study the extent to which 
transaction costs and information flows can account for Australian 
investment behaviour. 
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CHAPTER IV: DATA DESCRIPTION 
IV.1 HOLDINGS DATA 
Only recently has high quality data on cross border investment holdings 
been available. Previously, models on investor behaviour employed 
accumulated capital flows data to measure holdings of assets between 
countries. This data was unsuitable as an estimate of bilateral equity 
holdings as shown by Tesar and Werner (1995) and Warnock and Cleaver 
(2003). The problem is that capital flows data are designed to track the 
flow of money between countries for balance of payments objectives. The 
foreign country identified in this data is quite frequently an intermediary 
body and not the issuer of the security. Accumulated capital flow data can 
thus deliver distorted estimates of bilateral equity holdings and is 
inappropriate for use in models on international investor behaviour.  
In response, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) conducted the first 
Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) on 29 countries in 1997. 
The CPIS collects information on portfolio investment holdings by 
domestic residents of securities issued by unrelated non-residents. This 
was done to allow cross country comparisons and improve the coverage 
of cross border portfolio investment assets and liabilities. The second 
survey was conducted in 2001 with 69 economies and has since been 
performed annually, the most recent in 2005 with 72 countries.  
Figure 3 demonstrates how the total value of Australian foreign 
investment has increased from AUD 120 billion to AUD 170 billion 
between 2001 and 2005. Table 1 and Table 2 present summary statistics 
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for the distribution of Australian portfolio holdings from the CPIS database 
for 2001 and 2005 respectively. The composition of a typical Australian 
equity portfolio is displayed in Column 1. What is clear is the strong 
preference of investors for domestic equities; over 80 per cent of the 
typical Australian portfolio is invested in local equities for both years.  
Column 2 provides the composition of a typical Australian investor’s 
foreign equity portfolio, that is, the portfolio excluding domestic stocks. 
The United States was the country of choice for Australian investors with 
US stocks comprising 58 per cent of the Australian foreign equity portfolio 
in 2001 and 54 per cent in 2005. Next for 2001, by a large margin, are 
UK equities, contributing 9 per cent, followed by Japan at 5.8 per cent 
and surprisingly, the Netherlands. However by 2005 Australian Japanese 
equities comprised a larger proportion than UK equities, 9.4 per cent and 
8.1 per cent respectively. The Netherlands was stable at the fourth largest 
share. Also making minor contributions are Germany, Hong Kong and 
Korea. These seven countries account for over 85 percent of the 
Australian foreign equity portfolio in 2001. 
The third column provides the share of each country’s market 
capitalisation in the world portfolio which corresponds to the share 
predicted by standard portfolio theory. This benchmark is calculated 
under the assumptions that global capital markets are complete, investors 
in all countries have identical preferences and choose their portfolios 
optimally based on the international CAPM of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner 
(1965). 
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Column 4 provides a measure of the extent to which Australian investors 
underweight their holdings in specific foreign countries. It is calculated as 
each country’s weight in the Australian portfolio relative to its weight in 
the world portfolio. If, as predicted by the ICAPM, the size of the market 
was the only determinant of the geographic distribution of international 
equity holdings, then we would expect very little variation in this measure 
across countries. Interestingly, the variation across countries is 
significant; Australian investors drastically underweight all equities except 
New Zealand and domestic equities.  
For example, the relative weight in Australian portfolio for the United 
States in 2005 is almost 0.25, indicating that Australian holdings of US 
stocks at the end of 2001 were 25 per cent of what traditional portfolio 
theory would have predicted. On the other hand, Australians invested only 
5 per cent of the ICAPM levels in countries such as Austria and India. 
Our measure against each country of Australian investors’ home bias, (as 
used in Ahearne et al (2004), shown in column 5, is calculated as 1 minus 
the ratio of the share in Australian to world portfolios. A greater value of 
this measure corresponds to a lower relative weight in the Australian 
portfolio and hence, a greater degree of bias. In 2005, bias varies from 
0.997 for Poland, where Australian holdings are less than 1 per cent of 
the benchmark, to 0.11 for New Zealand, where Australian holdings are 
111 per cent of benchmark. 
The two goals of this thesis are to explain the geographic pattern of the 
Australian equity holdings and to investigate the distribution of the 
measure of Australian investors’ home bias across countries.  
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Because most economic data is available in US dollars and this study 
takes an Australian perspective, all values are transformed into Australian 
dollars. This is done to ensure that exchange rate risk is fully taken into 
account and all returns are realised in Australian dollars to represent the 
realised nominal returns of a typical Australian investor.  
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Figure 3: Distribution of Australian International  
Equity Holdings 2001-2005 
0
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
120,000
140,000
160,000
180,000
M
ill
io
ns
 o
f A
U
D
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Year
Hong Kong
Germany
France
Netherlands
Japan
United Kingdom
United States
Other
 
Note:  
Data is from the Co-ordinated Portfolio Investment Survey, IMF 
(2001-2005) 
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Table 1: Australian Portfolio Holdings 2001 
Country
Share in 
Australian 
equity 
portfolio   
(1)
Share in 
Australian 
foreign 
equity 
portfolio    
(2)
Share in world 
market      
capitalisation  
(3)
Relative 
weight in 
portfolio 
(1)÷(3)   
(4)
Bias   
1-(4)  
(5)
Major Industrial Countries
United States 10.63% 58.26% 54.49% 0.195 0.805
United Kingdom 1.65% 9.05% 9.96% 0.166 0.834
Japan 1.06% 5.80% 13.85% 0.076 0.924
Germany 0.47% 2.60% 4.06% 0.117 0.883
Other Advanced Countries
Australia 81.76% 1.49%
Netherlands 1.01% 5.53% 2.56% 0.395 0.605
Hong Kong 0.40% 2.17% 2.24% 0.177 0.823
Finland 0.10% 0.54% 0.93% 0.106 0.894
Norway 0.03% 0.17% 0.23% 0.134 0.866
New Zealand 0.02% 0.09% 0.08% 0.193 0.807
Austria 0.00% 0.02% 0.10% 0.032 0.968
Poland 0.00% 0.01% 0.11% 0.023 0.977
Emerging Asia
Korea 0.11% 0.63% 0.62% 0.184 0.816
India 0.02% 0.12% 0.46% 0.049 0.951
China 0.02% 0.11% 0.72% 0.027 0.973
Other 2.45% 13.41% 8.09% 0.302 0.698  
Note:  
Data on foreign equity holdings by Australian is from the Co-ordinated Portfolio 
Investment Survey (CPIS), IMF 2001. Share in world market capitalisation was 
taken from market capitalisation data from DataStream. The per cent of 
domestic holdings for Australians was implied using CPIS data and data on 
market capitalisation of Australia for year end 2001 from DataStream.  
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Table 2: Australian Portfolio Holdings 2005 
Country
Share in 
Australia
n equity 
portfolio  
(1)
Share in 
Australian 
foreign 
equity 
portfolio   
(2)
Share in world 
market      
capitalisation  
(3)
Relative 
weight in 
portfolio 
(1)÷(3)    
(4)
Bias   
1-(4)   
(5)
Major Industrial Countries
United States 8.94% 54.34% 36.16% 0.247 0.753
Japan 1.55% 9.40% 9.49% 0.163 0.837
United Kingdom 1.34% 8.14% 7.50% 0.178 0.822
Germany 0.44% 2.65% 3.01% 0.145 0.855
Other Advanced Countries
Australia 83.55% 1.84%
Netherlands 0.97% 5.88% 1.66% 0.582 0.418
Hong Kong 0.20% 1.21% 1.98% 0.101 0.899
New Zealand 0.13% 0.76% 0.11% 1.119 -0.119
Finland 0.05% 0.30% 0.47% 0.105 0.895
Norway 0.04% 0.27% 0.39% 0.115 0.885
Austria 0.02% 0.11% 0.27% 0.066 0.934
Poland 0.00% 0.00% 0.16% 0.003 0.997
Emerging Asia
Korea 0.23% 1.38% 1.05% 0.216 0.784
India 0.08% 0.48% 1.56% 0.051 0.949
China 0.02% 0.15% 0.85% 0.028 0.972
Other 2.45% 14.87% 33.49% 0.073 0.927  
Note:  
Data on foreign equity holdings by Australian is from the Co-ordinated Portfolio 
Investment Survey (CPIS), IMF 2005. Share in world market capitalisation was 
taken from market capitalisation data from DataStream. The per cent of 
domestic holdings for Australians was implied using CPIS data and data on 
market capitalisation of Australia for year end 2005 from DataStream.  
 28 
IV.2 DIVERSIFICATION INCENTIVES AND RISK 
Under very strict assumptions of perfect markets, the international CAPM 
predicts that in order to optimise the risk-return profile of their portfolio, 
investors should hold equities in the proportions that they exist in the 
market. This allows for maximum gains from diversification and instructs 
investors to hold the market portfolio. This introduces three factors into the 
investor’s portfolio decision; they are the size of the relevant market, the 
risk return profile and the correlation between foreign returns and 
Australian returns. 
Market Size 
Market capitalisation data is taken from DataStream. The total value of all 
public equity for each market is the Australian dollar value as of the 31st of 
December for each year in millions of dollars.  
Historical Reward to Risk Ratio 
Assuming that investors care about returns and base their expectations 
about future returns on past returns then Australian investors may 
underweight countries whose stock markets have performed poorly. This 
momentum or return-chasing effect is captured by a reward-to-risk ratio, 
the mean daily return over its standard deviation. This measure is in 
accordance with Ahearne et al (2004). Data is based on the chief stock 
market indices for the countries studied (see Table 3 for specific indices) for 
the returns of the previous year. This variable is expected to have a 
positive effect on investment location and a negative impact on the 
measure of bias. 
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Correlation 
Investing in countries whose equity returns are negatively correlated with 
the returns of the home country generates substantial gains from 
diversification. Calculations of correlations between Australia and other 
countries are calculated as the correlation of daily returns over the previous 
year. Data is taken from the indices listed in Table 3 Correlations are 
expected to have a negative effect on international investment and positive 
impact on the measure of bias. 
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Table 3: Stock Market Indices 
Country Index name
Australia S&P ASX All ordinaries
Austria Austrian Traded Index
Belgium Belgian All Shares Index
Brazil Ibovespa
Canada S&P TSX-60
China Shanghai Composite
Denmark OMX Copenhagen All Share
Finland OMX Helsinki All-Share
France CAC-40 Index
Germany CDAX
Greece Athex Composite Share Price Index
Hong Kong HSI Hang Seng Index
India BSE-200
Italy Milan SE MIB-30
Japan Nikkei 500 Stock Average
Korea KSE KOSPI 
Mexico IPC
Netherlands AEX Index
New Zealand NZX All Index
Norway Oslo Exchange All Share
Poland Warsaw SE Index WIG
Spain Madrid Stock Market General Index
Sweden OMX Stockholm 30
Switzerland UB-100 Index
UK FTSE-100
USA Dow Jones Industrial Average
World MSCI World Index  
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IV.3 DIRECT BARRIERS TO INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
One of the crucial assumptions of the international CAPM is that global 
financial markets are free from barriers to international investment. In 
practice, barriers do exist and may influence the geographic pattern of 
Australian investment decisions.  
Capital Controls 
Direct barriers to international investment such as capital controls and 
transaction costs have been dismissed by the literature because, even when 
statistically significant, they have little economic relevance (see Ahearne et al 
2004). The role of transaction costs have been downplayed by French and 
Poterba (1991) because they would have to be implausibly high to explain 
the observed home bias and because they do not appear to deter investors 
from turning over their international holdings more frequently than their 
domestic ones (see Tesar and Wernar 1995). However, capital controls can 
still affect the decisions of international investors and lead to home bias. This 
thesis employs the Miniane (2004) capital control measures. This measure is 
based in the IMF’s Annual report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions (AREAER) for the year 2000, it is expected to have a negative 
impact on equity holdings and a positive impact on the measure of home 
bias. 
IV. 4 INDIRECT BARRIERS TO INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
Indirect costs, such as those that arise from lack of legal protection or from 
informational disadvantages against local residences, may play a vital role in 
the determination of investment patterns.  
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Legal protection and the quality of the enforcement matter for corporate 
ownership patterns around the world. If managers are not held legally 
accountable to their shareholders then investors may not be protected from 
expropriation by insiders. This could shape their willingness to participate in 
the equity markets of certain countries. Legal protection is measured by the 
efficiency of the judicial system and the rule of law as used in La Porta et al 
(1998) and by country of legal origin used in La Porta et al (2002). 
Efficiency of the Judicial System   
Efficiency of the judicial system index is developed by the country risk rating 
agency Business International Corporation (BIC). This index may be taken to 
represent investors’ assessments of the efficiency and integrity of the legal 
environment as it affects business. This variable ranges from 0 to 10, where 
lower values denote lower levels of efficiency, and is the average between 
1980 and 1983.  
Rule of Law 
Rule of law index, also developed by BIC, provides an assessment of the law 
and order tradition in the country. It also ranges from 0 to 10 with lower 
values representing less law and order and is the average of the months of 
April and October of the monthly index between 1982 and 1995. 
Country of Legal Origin 
La Porta (2002) stresses the importance of country of legal origin as a 
determinant of financial development. Countries that have adopted the 
British based common law are considered to give two advantages over 
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countries whose legal systems are based on the civil law systems of France, 
Germany and Scandinavia. First, common law offers greater priority to the 
rights of individual investors compared with the state. Second, due to the 
presence of jurisprudence in English common law, where law evolves and is 
created by judges instead of relying on statutory law, common law is far 
more flexible at being able to adapt to changes in commercial 
circumstances’. Legal systems that adapt quickly will foster financial 
development more effectively than would more rigid legal traditions. La Porta 
(2002) find that countries that have inherited legal systems of UK origin in 
general offer investors a greater degree of protection. They also conclude 
that countries with French civil law legal origin provide the worst investor 
protection, and that Scandinavian and German legal systems are somewhere 
in the middle.  
When considering which stocks to purchase investors need to collect 
information about the profitability of the firm in order to differentiate 
between them. If information asymmetries in certain countries make 
differentiation difficult, then foreign investors may find that they are less able 
to select the top performing stocks than local investors, who have better 
information.  
Accounting Standards 
Information asymmetries could be owing to a variety of sources. One 
possible source may be the quality of accounting standards. Generally, 
investors gather information about foreign firms by analysing their 
accounting statements and historical stock market data. Low levels of 
transparency and poor disclosure requirements regarding the accounts will 
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make it harder for investors to distinguish between firms from different 
countries. Those firms from countries where disclosure requirements are 
lacking will be perceived as more risky than firms that portray a high degree 
of transparency in their balance sheets. Foreign investors have to interpret 
and compare this information in light of the relevant legal and business 
environment and this leads to costs. An index of accounting standards, used 
in La Porta et al (1998) is created by the International Accounting and 
Auditing Trends. This variable provides a measure of the quality of 
accounting standards and ranges from 0 to 100. However, the usefulness of 
this measure may be dubious as it is only available for 1990 and accounting 
standards have improved in many countries since then.  
Gravity Variables 
Traditional gravity models find that when estimating trade in goods, distance 
serves as an excellent proxy for transaction costs and trade barriers. 
However, when considering trade in financial assets there are two possible 
approaches. First, it might be that those variables that influence trade in 
goods also influence trade in assets. In which case, the value of traded goods 
should be included in the regression. However, this provides little intuition 
behind what these variables might be and how they affect investment 
decisions. The alternate approach would be to use distance as a proxy for 
barriers to investment. 
This approach was successfully applied by Portes, Rey & Oh (2001) where 
trade in financial assets was estimated using a gravity model. In their study 
they found that distance has a negative impact on asset trade. This seems 
counterintuitive because, unlike goods, assets are weightless and thus any 
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direct barriers to investment (such as transaction costs) associated with 
them should not be correlated with distance. Therefore, distance initially 
seems like an improbable variable to be including in a regression analysis.  
One reason for including distance is because of the implications for 
diversification benefits. Countries that are further away from each other have 
lower correlations between their business cycles. Thus in order to maximise 
potential benefits form diversification, investors should purchase assets in 
countries which are further away. This implies that distance should have a 
positive impact of asset trade and a negative impact on home bias.  
The alternative reason for including distance is that it could be a proxy for 
information asymmetries. Countries that are geographically near to each 
other have better information about each other due to trade, business and 
tourism linkages, common languages and media coverage. Geographical 
distance is a barrier to interaction among economic agents and cultural 
exchange. Therefore in order to take advantage of informational advantages 
investors should invest in neighbouring countries. This hypothesis seems 
consistent the findings of Portes, Rey & Oh (2001). However, because this 
study takes an Australian perspective, and because Australia is unique in its 
isolated location, the role of distance as a proxy for information may not be 
as robust as in other studies that take a European or American perspective. 
Culture links 
Because distance may be inappropriate as a proxy for information exchange; 
other variables need to be investigated. Home bias may be part of a 
phenomenon where investors demonstrate a preference for familiar stocks. 
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In which case, variables such as common language and short term visitors 
that describe cultural similarities might explain investors’ preference for firms 
from certain countries.    
Common language promotes a sense of cultural familiarity and is important 
for bilateral equity holdings. Language is the common language dummy 
variable which is equal to one if the destination country’s official language is 
English, otherwise the value is zero. This variable is expected to have a 
positive impact on equity investment. Data on common languages comes 
from the CIA World Factbook 20075.  
Cultural familiarity may also be related to the destination of Australians’ 
overseas trips and to the geographic origins of short term visitors in 
Australia. By travelling to other countries and by interacting with 
international visitors, Australians may develop a better understanding of 
different customs and cultures. This could affect the geographic location of 
their equity investment decision. Data on short term travellers, 
disaggregated by country, is available from the ABS.  
                                      
5 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ 
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CHAPTER V: ESTIMATION OF AUSTRALIAN 
INVESTMENT AND HOME BIAS 
V.1 MODELLING EQUITY HOLDINGS AND EQUITY HOME BIAS 
This thesis begins its investigation into Australia’s foreign portfolio holdings 
by running a series of multivariate regressions. The first specification is 
derived by taking the natural logarithm of equation (1).6  
= α + + α +
α   
jt jt jt
jt
ln EQ MCP RET
TransactionCost Variables
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( ) ln( ) ln( )
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Equation (6) is the estimable form of the theoretical equation (1). Equity 
holdings are regressed on financial market size, risk-adjusted returns and 
transaction cost variables. 
The second part of the estimation considers explanations of equity home 
bias; that is, the deviation from international CAPM benchmark. Equation 
(7) is the empirical version of equation (5)7 (as derived in section 3b) 
where home bias is regressed against a vector of explanatory variables that 
measure historical risk-adjusted returns, direct barriers and indirect 
barriers to investment. 
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The dependent variable in equation (6); EQjt is the Australian dollar  
value of the stock of country j equity held by Australian residents  
at the end of year t.  The dependent variable in equation (7); EHBjt  
is the deviation from the international CAPM benchmark. The financial  
size of country j is taken as the Australian dollar value of the  
end of period t market capitalisation (MCPjt). The return variable  
(RETjt) is in accordance with Ahearne et al (2004) and is the ratio  
of average daily returns divided by the standard deviation of  
those returns. The transaction costs variables employed in  
these equations include correlation of financial markets (CRLljt), a measure 
of the extent of capital controls (CAPCjt),  efficiency of the judicial system 
(EFFjt), rule of law (ROLjt), rating of accounting standards  
(RAjt), trade share (TRADEjt), distance (DISTjt), common  
language (LANGjt), the number of short term visitors to and from Australia  
(STTjt) and dummy variables for UK, France, Scandinavia  
or Germany as the country of legal origin (UKLOjt, FRLOjt,  
SCLOjt and GELOjt). Both equations are estimated by allowing time fixed 
effects. 
Table 4 presents the correlation matrix for the variables used  
in the estimation. The variable Equity Holdings (EQjt) is positively  
related to market size, efficiency of the judicial system, rule  
of law, accounting standards, trade, distance, short term travellers  
and UK legal origin. Equity home bias (EHBjt) is negatively correlated  
with all variables except for French and German legal origin. The  
measure of capital controls is strongly negatively correlated  
with efficiency of the judicial system (-0.6687) and with rule of law  
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(-0.7684). There appears to be a high degree of correlation between  
the three variables from La Porta et al (1998), particularly  
between efficiency of the judicial system and rule of law (0.7609). Trade is 
highly correlated with both market size (0.6385) and with short term 
travellers (0.6129) and language is highly correlated with short term 
travellers (0.7259) and UK legal origin (0.7746). Short term travellers and 
UK legal origin have a correlation of 0.6170.  
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Table 4: Correlation Matrix (2001-2005) 
EQ jt EHB jt MCP jt RET jt CRL jt CC jt EFF jt ROL jt RA jt TRADE jt DIST jt LANG jt STT jt UKLO jt FRLO jt SCLO jt GELO jt
EQ jt -0.1775 0.9497 -0.0946 -0.2232 -0.1265 0.2421 0.2133 0.2063 0.5869 0.1282 0.5297 0.3640 0.3986 -0.1641 -0.1560 -0.1012
EHB jt -0.0864 -0.2409 -0.1516 0.3211 -0.3121 -0.3112 -0.2601 -0.1099 0.2233 -0.3188 -0.4740 -0.2139 0.0403 0.0734 0.1133
MCP jt -0.1580 -0.1509 -0.1177 0.2279 0.1970 0.2177 0.6385 0.0954 0.4958 0.3697 0.3800 -0.1897 -0.1524 -0.0360
RET jt 0.0191 0.0428 -0.0130 0.0605 -0.0550 -0.1617 -0.0963 0.0627 0.0912 0.0357 -0.0245 0.0191 -0.0246
CRL jt 0.1343 0.0787 -0.0631 0.1696 0.0896 -0.5043 -0.1001 0.1973 0.0858 -0.2163 0.1374 0.0394
CC jt -0.6687 -0.7684 -0.4145 -0.0889 -0.2495 -0.3505 -0.2760 -0.0672 0.2646 -0.1438 -0.1019
EFF jt 0.7609 0.5647 0.1579 0.0232 0.3184 0.3184 0.3103 -0.5938 0.3725 0.0155
ROL jt 0.5928 -0.0731 0.3545 0.2829 0.1335 0.0172 -0.2102 0.3667 -0.1040
RA jt 0.0782 0.0700 0.4087 0.2795 0.3293 -0.4451 0.4422 -0.2086
TRADE jt -0.4390 0.3295 0.6129 0.2336 -0.3810 -0.2626 0.4200
DIST jt -0.1251 -0.5780 -0.3516 0.3565 0.2063 -0.2262
LANG jt 0.7259 0.7766 -0.3273 -0.1905 -0.2453
STT jt 0.6036 -0.3797 -0.2520 0.0395
UKLO jt -0.4215 -0.2453 -0.3158
FRLO jt -0.3273 -0.4215
SCLO jt -0.2453
GELO jt
Note:  
EQjt: Australian dollar value of equity holdings in country j at time t measured in millions of dollars, EHBjt: Measure of home bias, MCPjt: Australian dollar 
value of the end of period t market capitalisation measured in millions of dollars, RETjt: Average daily returns divided by standard deviation of daily returns 
over the year t, CRLjt: The correlation of the financial market in country j with the Australian financial market over the year t, CCjt: The index for capital 
restrictions in the year 2000, EFFjt: The efficiency of the judicial system, ROLjt: Rule of Law, RAjt: Rating on accounting standards, TRADEjt: The share of 
Australia’s total trade that is with country j over the year t as a percentage, DISTjt: The distance in kilometres between Canberra and the Capital City of 
country j, LANGjt: Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the official language in country j is English, STTjt: The sum of the total number of short term 
arrivals to Australia from country j and the total number of short term departures to country j, UKLOjt: Dummy variable taking the value of one if country 
j’s legal system is of UK origin, FRLOjt: Dummy variable taking the value of one if country j’s legal system is of French origin, SCLOjt: Dummy variable 
taking the value of one if country j’s legal system is of Scandinavian origin, GELOjt: Dummy variable taking the value of one if country j’s legal system is of 
German origin. 
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
EQ EHB MCP RET CRL EFF ROL RA CC
 Mean 6,400.87 0.82 1,518,579 0.02 0.17 8.71 8.44 64.12 0.36
 Median 953.50 0.87 414,555 0.03 0.14 9.50 9.11 64.00 0.29
 Maximum 93,631.10 1.00 25,383,608 0.23 0.52 10.00 10.00 83.00 0.86
 Minimum 3.00 -0.12 30,087 -0.11 -0.06 5.75 4.17 36.00 0.14
 Std. Dev. 17,429.13 0.18 3,715,807 0.07 0.12 1.56 1.91 9.79 0.24
 Skewness 3.89 -3.03 5 0.38 0.74 -0.77 -0.93 -0.56 1.12
 Kurtosis 17.10 13.82 24 2.55 3.33 1.99 2.41 3.95 2.94
 Jarque-Bera 1,059.15 627.91 2,769 4.11 11.94 17.04 19.21 11.35 24.11
 Probability 0.00 0.00 0 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
 Observations 98 98 125 125 125 120 120 125 115
 Cross sections 25 25 25 25 25 24 24 25 23
DIST LANG STT UKLO FRLO SCLO GELO
 Mean 13,877 0.16 245,659 0.24 0.36 0.16 0.24 2.26
 Median 15,809 0.00 68,200 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.82
 Maximum 17,581 1.00 1,934,100 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 13.14
 Minimum 2,322 0.00 6,600 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
 Std. Dev. 3,895 0.37 390,013 0.43 0.48 0.37 0.43 3.18
 Skewness -1 1.85 2 1.22 0.58 1.85 1.22 1.98
 Kurtosis 4 4.44 8 2.48 1.34 4.44 2.48 6.05
 Jarque-Bera 50 82.48 256 32.28 21.44 82.48 32.28 130.17
 Probability 0 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
 Observations 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125
TRADE
 
Note:  
EQjt: Australian dollar value of equity holdings in country j at time t measured in millions of 
dollars, EHBjt: Measure of home bias, MCPjt: Australian dollar value of the end of period t 
market capitalisation measured in millions of dollars, RETjt: Average daily returns divided by 
standard deviation of daily returns over the year t, CRLjt: The correlation of the financial 
market in country j with the Australian financial market over the year t, CCjt: The index for 
capital restrictions in the year 2000, EFFjt: The efficiency of the judicial system, ROLjt: Rule 
of Law, RAjt: Rating on accounting standards, TRADEjt: The share of Australia’s total trade 
that is with country j over the year t as a percentage, DISTjt: The distance in kilometres 
between Canberra and the Capital City of country j, LANGjt: Dummy variable taking the 
value of 1 if the official language in country j is English, STTjt: The sum of the total number 
of short term arrivals to Australia from country j and the total number of short term 
departures to country j, UKLOjt: Dummy variable taking the value of one if country j’s legal 
system is of UK origin, FRLOjt: Dummy variable taking the value of one if country j’s legal 
system is of French origin, SCLOjt: Dummy variable taking the value of one if country j’s 
legal system is of Scandinavian origin, GELOjt: Dummy variable taking the value of one if 
country j’s legal system is of German origin. 
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V.2 EMPIRICAL RESULTS FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
The empirical results for equation (6) are based on years 2001 to 2005. The 
partner countries are Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, India, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Poland, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States.  
Table 6 provides the estimation results for equation (6)8 where the 
dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the stock of equity holdings. 
Column (1) represents international equity holdings in terms of the market 
capitalisation of the destination country. What is clear is that there is a broad 
correspondence between investment and financial market size. In particular, 
market size accounts for over eighty percent of the geographic pattern of 
Australia’s foreign equity investment. This variable is both statistically and 
economically significant, where a one per cent increase in the market size of 
country j corresponds to a 1.2 per cent increase in the stock of country j 
equity holdings held by Australians.  
Column (2) represents Australia’s holdings of the destination country in 
terms of market size, return to risk ratio and correlation. Market size is 
robust in economic and statistical significance to including these two 
diversification variables. The coefficient on Reward to Risk (RETjt) implies 
that a 1 unit increase in the ratio of average returns to standard deviation of 
returns for a destination country corresponds with a 4.19 per cent increase in 
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the equity holdings of that country.9 Although this sounds like a significant 
effect it is important to keep in the mind that the Reward to Risk variable 
ranges only from -0.11 to 0.23 (see Table 5). A better interpretation would 
be that for a given level of risk, a 1 per cent increase in the annual return of 
the equities of a country will correspond with a 0.0419 per cent increase in 
the Australian equity holdings of that country. Although statistically 
significant, the economic importance is quite small. The other diversification 
variable, correlation, is positive and significant at the one percent level. This 
is contrary to the hypothesis of the international CAPM that those countries 
whose financial markets are less correlated with the Australian financial 
market should offer greater gains to diversification to the Australian investor. 
However, it is possible that those developed countries that are more likely to 
exhibit a greater degree of correlation with Australia are also more likely to 
boast an environment that nurtures ease of information flow. Thus it is 
possible that correlation is acting as a proxy for information flow. The effect 
of direct barriers to investment is considered in column (3). As expected, 
Australian investors are less likely to invest in countries with restrictive 
capital controls.  
Columns (4) to (12) introduce a number of variables that measure indirect 
transaction costs facing the Australian investor. Columns (4) to (7) provide 
the breakdown of the legal protection and transparency variables provided by 
La Porta et al (1998). A one unit change in the efficiency of the judicial 
system, rule of law and rating of accounting standards relates to a change in 
equity holdings by 0.36 per cent, 0.27 per cent and 0.12 per cent 
                                      
9 Note: The statistical interpretation for a log-linear relationship  
(where ln(Y) = α(1)+α(2)X )is that a one unit increase in X corresponds with a 
α(2) per cent increase in Y. 
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respectively. Although all three are significant at the one per cent level, the 
variable that holds the most explanatory power is the rating on accounting 
standards, accounting for over 30 per cent of the geographic location of 
Australian equity investment. However, these variables are all highly 
correlated (see Table 4) and this becomes apparent when all three are 
regressed together in column (7); all lose economic significance and rule of 
law loses statistical significance. Due to the presence of collinearity, rule of 
law is dropped from the final regression in column (13).  
Columns (8) and (9) look at the effect of trade share on the geographical 
location of equity holdings. A simple regression of trade share on the 
logarithm of equity holdings in column (8) supports the consideration that 
Australians are more likely to invest in countries that are major trading 
partners. However, when the logarithm of market capitalisation is included in 
the regression, the coefficient on trade share switches sign and becomes 
insignificant. Trade share is considerably correlated with market capitalisation 
(0.64) (see Table 4) which suggests that trade share is acting as a proxy for 
size. Once the full set of information flow variables have been included in the 
regression; trade share imparts some explanatory power (see column (13)) 
but is of the incorrect sign.  
Column (10) addresses the importance of distance as a proxy for transaction 
costs and information flow. The theoretical intuition is that the greater the 
distance between two countries, the lower the flow of information between 
them. However distance might capture a size effect in the data. Specifically, 
those countries that are financially large, such as the United States and the 
United Kingdom, also happen to be far away from Australia. To account for 
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this, the logarithm of market cap is included in the regression. A one per cent 
increase in distance is associated with a 0.61 per cent decrease in the value 
of equity holdings. Once the size of the financial market is taken into 
account, distance is both economically and statistically significant. This is 
despite the unique geographic location of Australia.  
Columns (11) and (12) investigate the impact of short term travellers and 
common language in determining equity holdings. Both are statistically 
significant at the one per cent level. An increase in the number of short term 
travellers between Australia and another country by one per cent 
corresponds with an increase in the value of Australian equity holdings in 
that country by 2.15 per cent. Similarly, English speaking countries are 
associated with higher equity holdings in the order of 0.78 per cent.  
The final model is presented in column (13). Additional dummy variables are 
included representing the origin of the legal system and the variable for rule 
of law is eliminated due to the presence of collinearity. Market size is still 
significant and robust to including information variables. However, the ratio 
of reward to risk, correlation and capital controls are no longer significant 
when variables measuring information asymmetries are introduced into the 
regression. This suggests that investors are more likely to make decisions 
based on informational advantages or disadvantages than on historical 
returns, risks, correlations and direct costs to investment. Efficiency of the 
judicial system, common language and the logarithm of the number of short 
term travellers all have positive and significant effects on the value of foreign 
equity held by Australians. Distance as a proxy for transaction costs has a 
negative and significant effect on equity holdings. The effect of the rating on 
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accounting standards and the trade share is ambiguous. Intuitively, both 
should be positive, yet both are negative and significant at the one per cent 
level. However, the economic significance of these variables is rather small. 
Given that the maximum value of trade share is 13.14 per cent (see Table 
5), an increase in the trade share of a particular country by one percentage 
point is associated with a decrease in equity holdings by 0.15 per cent. 
Similarly, the effect of a ten unit increase in the index of the rating of 
accounting standards (which ranges from zero to 100) only corresponds with 
0.26 per cent decrease in the value of equity holdings. Also, given that the 
rating on accounting standards measure was calculated in 1990 and many 
countries have since improved the transparency of their balance sheets, the 
usefulness of this measure may be limited to the extent.  
Dummy variables for the country of legal origin are also included in the 
regression in column (13). Because United Kingdom, French, German and 
Scandinavian legal origin variables are both mutually exclusive and 
collectively exhaustive, to avoid perfect multicollinearity French legal origin is 
excluded from the regression. The findings of La Porta et al (2002) would 
suggest that the coefficients on all of these three dummy variables should by 
positive with UK legal origin being of the largest magnitude. However, the 
results of the regression suggest that investors are more likely to invest in 
countries with a Scandinavian legal origin, followed by French, then German 
and least likely to invest in countries with British common law. However, 
there exists strong negative correlation between the French legal origin 
dummy and efficiency of the judicial system as well as strong positive 
correlation between the UK legal origin dummy and both common language 
and short term travellers. Nevertheless, all three dummies are significant at 
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the one per cent level of significance and are therefore included in the 
regression. We find that once Australian investors take into account other 
information variables they will invest an extra 0.42 per cent in countries of 
Scandinavian legal origin over countries of French legal origin, an extra 0.37 
per cent in countries of French legal origin over countries of German legal 
origin and an extra 1.33 per cent in countries of French legal origin over 
countries of British legal origin.  
The empirical results for equation (6) show that market size matters for 
asset trade which is consistent with the hypothesis of the traditional CAPM. 
The results also support the information asymmetry explanation of the home 
bias puzzle. In particular, variables that have high explanatory power for the 
geographic location of Australian equity holdings are market capitalisation, 
efficiency of the judicial system, common language and the number of short 
term travellers.  
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Table 6: Australian International Equity Holdings Regression results 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
-8.844 *** -10.263 *** 7.837 *** 3.812 *** 4.701 *** -0.849 0.533 6.071 *** -9.024 *** -3.601 *** 6.487 *** -2.037 *** -5.948 **
0.482 0.456 0.044 0.214 0.286 0.620 0.595 0.094 0.287 1.244 0.036 0.773 2.267
1.199 *** 1.278 *** 1.215 *** 1.242 *** 1.334 ***
0.037 0.031 0.020 0.045 0.057
4.190 ** 0.746
1.730 1.535
1.857 *** 0.910
0.360 0.722
-2.098 *** -0.235
0.127 0.186
0.365 *** 0.091 *** 0.167 ***
0.024 0.033 0.032
0.274 *** 0.022
0.033 0.027
0.119 *** 0.084 *** -0.026 ***
0.010 0.010 0.003
0.326 *** -0.011 -0.153 ***
0.038 0.013 0.017
-0.614 *** -0.766 ***
0.178 0.164
2.149 *** 0.927 ***
0.197 0.189
0.782 *** 0.300 ***
0.068 0.054
-1.334 ***
0.329
-0.368 **
0.140
0.422 ***
0.157
R-squared 0.834 0.854 0.128 0.130 0.125 0.347 0.232 0.327 0.834 0.851 0.202 0.391 0.951
Adj R-squared 0.825 0.843 0.077 0.082 0.075 0.311 0.170 0.290 0.824 0.841 0.159 0.358 0.940
F-statistic 92.60 75.17 2.52 2.67 2.53 9.76 3.75 8.93 76.45 86.59 4.67 11.83 84.58
Observations 98 98 92 95 95 98 95 98 98 98 98 98 92
UK Legal Origin
German Legal Origin
Scandinavian Legal 
Origin
Trade Share
log(Distance)
Common Language
log(St Travellers)
Capital Controls
Efficiency of the 
Judicial System
Rule of Law
Accounting 
Standards
Constant
log(Market Size)
Reward to Risk
Correlation
 
Note: The numbers in parenthesis are White adjusted standard errors. ‘***’ means the t-statistic is 1% significant, ‘**’ means the t-statistic is 
5% significant, ‘*’ means the t-statistic is 10% significant. 
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V.3 EMPIRICAL RESULTS FOR EQUITY HOME BIAS  
The empirical results for equation (7)10 are based on years 2001 to 2005 
and presented in Table 7. The partner countries are the same as for 
equation (6). Column (1) addresses the contribution of return seeking 
behaviour to equity home bias. Risk-adjusted returns are expected to 
have a negative effect on the deviation from benchmark yet they are 
positive and significant. In column (2) the effect of the correlation is 
negative and significant at the five per cent level of significance indicating 
that Australian investors are less biased against countries whose financial 
markets are correlated with the Australian financial market. When 
regressed independently in column (3), capital control is positive, 
statistically significant at the one per cent level of significance and 
economically significant; a complete reduction of capital controls (from 1 
to 0) will reduce the measure of bias by 0.19. This is equivalent to 
increasing actual equity holdings as a percentage of the international 
CAPM benchmark by 19 per cent.  
The legal protection and transparency variables from La Porta et al (1998) 
are regressed in columns (4) to (6). When regressed independently all 
three are significant at the one per cent level and of the correct sign, 
negative. An increase in the efficiency of the judicial system by one unit 
will result in a decrease in equity home bias of 0.034. Similarly, an 
increase in the measure of rule of law will decrease equity home bias by 
0.029, an increase in equity holdings as a percentage of CAPM benchmark 
by 2.9 per cent. The rating on accounting standards ranges from zero to 
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100 so an increase of 10 points corresponds with a decrease in home bias 
by 0.05. This is analogous to increasing equity holdings as a percentage 
of benchmark by five per cent. Trade share (column (7)) also has a 
negative effect on home bias and significant at the 10 per cent level. This 
supports the consideration that Australian investors choose to invest in 
countries with which they are familiar through trading relations. Column 
(8) shows the effect of common language on equity home bias. Australian 
investors invest an extra 14.3 per cent of equity holdings as a percentage 
of CAPM benchmark in countries where the official language is English. 
This result is significant at the one per cent level of significance. The 
effect of short term travellers is shown in column (9). An increase in the 
number of short term travellers by 100 000 people corresponds with an 
increase in equity holdings as a percentage of benchmark by two 
per cent. The result is statistically significant. For the legal origin dummy 
variables in column (10) UK legal origin is the only one that is significant, 
corresponding with a decrease in equity home bias of five percentage 
points. This is consistent with the results of La Porta (2002). The common 
law legal system found in the United Kingdom is considered to be more 
flexible and provides better protection for individuals than civil law legal 
systems found in France, Germany and Scandinavia.  
Column (11) looks at the effect of these variables when included in a 
single multivariate regression. Risk-adjusted returns remain positive but 
gains significance. The coefficient on correlation remains negative but 
loses significance. The effect of capital controls switches sign and loses 
statistical significance when other information variables are included. 
Efficiency of the judicial system is significant at the one per cent level and 
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of the correct sign. Rule of law and rating on accounting standards were 
excluded due to high correlation with previously discussed variables (see 
Table 4). Trade share switches sign when other information flow variables 
are included. This could be due to the presence of colinearity as trade 
share is highly correlated with the number of short term travellers 
(0.613). Language is negative, supporting the reasoning that investors 
prefer investing in countries that have a similar language but is 
insignificant.  The number of short term travellers remains negative and 
significant when other variables are included. An increase in the number 
of short term travellers by 100 000 people corresponds with a decrease in 
the measure of equity home bias by 0.026.  
As previously discussed, the coefficients on the legal origin dummy 
variables should all be negative with UK being of the largest magnitude. 
The null hypothesis that the coefficients on UK, German and Scandinavian 
legal origin are identical cannot be rejected at the one per cent nor five 
per cent level upon the performance of a Wald test (see Table 8). Thus, 
the regression in column (12) ranks the origin of the legal system so that 
Australian investors are least biased against French legal origin countries 
and indifferent between countries of UK, German and Scandinavian 
countries are legal origin. These rankings are somewhat different to the 
rankings of La Porta et al (2002) which consider UK countries to offer the 
most legal protection, French countries the least and German and 
Scandinavian somewhere in the middle. One reason for the difference in 
order could be attributed to the existence of outliers. In particular, 
Australian investors display a relatively low degree of bias towards 
equities originating from the Netherlands which is of French legal origin 
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(see Table 1 and Table 2) The empirical results in Table 7 show that 41 
per cent of the variation in equity home bias can be explained by the 
model in column (11). The results are supportive of the information 
asymmetry explanation of home bias. Variables that demonstrate 
explanatory power include the ratio of return to risk, efficiency of the 
judicial system, trade share, the number of short term travellers and legal 
origin dummy variables. 
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Table 7: Australian Equity Home Bias Regression Results 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
0.824 *** 0.857 *** 0.730 *** 1.122 *** 1.070 *** 1.142 *** 0.837 *** 0.851 *** 0.879 *** 0.821 *** 1.181 ***
0.007 0.015 0.023 0.066 0.053 0.055 0.007 0.008 0.015 0.023 0.103
0.035 0.378 **
0.401 0.182
-0.195 ** -0.192
0.090 0.117
0.186 *** -0.024
0.043 0.050
-0.034 *** -0.046 ***
0.007 0.014
-0.029 ***
0.006
-0.005 ***
0.001
-0.005 * 0.015 **
0.003 0.006
-0.143 *** -0.044
0.046 0.042
-0.020 *** -0.026 ***
0.000 0.000
-0.052 ** 0.212 **
0.026 0.090
0.043 0.124 ***
0.043 0.043
0.036 0.181 **
0.037 0.069
R-squared 0.132 0.147 0.250 0.221 0.238 0.196 0.140 0.224 0.323 0.175 0.503
Adj R-squared 0.085 0.101 0.206 0.177 0.195 0.152 0.094 0.182 0.287 0.110 0.413
F-statistic 2.798 3.171 5.719 5.036 5.546 4.479 3.005 5.306 8.794 2.718 5.572
Observations 98 98 92 95 95 98 98 98 98 98 98
Efficiency of the 
Judicial System
Rule of Law
Accounting 
Standards
Scandinavian Legal 
Origin
Trade Share
Common Language
ST Visitors 
(100,000's)
UK Legal Origin
German Legal 
Origin
Constant
Reward to Risk
Correlation
Capital Controls
 
Note: The numbers in parenthesis are White adjusted standard errors. ‘***’ means the t-statistic is 1% significant, ‘**’ means the t-
statistic is 5% significant, ‘*’ means the t-statistic is 10% significant. 
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Table 8: Wald test for the Differential  
Effect of Legal Origin 
Wald Test: C(9) = C(10)
Test Statistic Value  df    Probability
F-statistic 2.632979662 (1, 77)  0.108753
Chi-square 2.632979662 1 0.104665
Null Hypothesis Summary:
Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value  Std. Err.
C(9) - C(10) 0.087904 0.054173
Wald Test: C(9) = C(11)
Test Statistic Value  df    Probability
F-statistic 0.37781746 (1, 77)  0.540586
Chi-square 0.37781746 1 0.538774
Null Hypothesis Summary:
Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value  Std. Err.
C(9) - C(11) 0.031357 0.051014
Wald Test: C(10) = C(11)
Test Statistic Value  df    Probability
F-statistic 2.819983007 (1, 77)  0.097151
Chi-square 2.819983007 1 0.093097
Null Hypothesis Summary:
Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value  Std. Err.
C(10) - C(11) -0.05655 0.033674  
Note:  
C(9) is the coefficient on UK legal origin; C(10) is the coefficient 
on German legal origin; C(11) is the coefficient on Scandinavian 
legal origin 
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CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION 
This thesis employs the IMF’s high quality CPIS dataset to investigate 
investment behaviour from the perspective of an Australian investor. A 
series of regression tests were conducted to determine two things; i) 
which factors are important for the geography of Australian equity 
holdings, and ii) what determines the extent of equity home bias 
displayed by Australian investors? The results suggest that indirect 
barriers to international investment and information costs are important 
factors behind international investment and the home bias puzzle. 
For equity holdings, market size imparts the majority of the explanatory 
power in determining the allocation of the Australian foreign equity 
portfolio (Table 6 and Table 7). This is consistent with the international 
CAPM and the theoretical gravity models of Martin and Rey (2004) and 
Faruqee, Li and Yan (2004).11  
In the results for both international equity holdings (Table 6) and equity 
home bias (Table 7) the variables for risk adjusted returns, diversification 
incentives and capital controls are found to be insignificant in influencing 
investment behaviour once information asymmetries are taken into 
account. In particular, this thesis documents that Australian investors 
exhibit a preference for countries where the number of short term 
bilateral travellers is high, the official language is English and that have a 
high a rating on the efficiency of the judicial system.  
                                      
11 See Chapter III 
 56 
Language is important because it is not only a mechanism for the 
transmission of information but it also creates a sense of cultural 
familiarity between investors in two different countries. Australian 
investors will be more comfortable reading balance sheets and making 
investment decisions when the firm in question publicises annual reports 
in English. In addition, the ability to communicate verbally between 
Australian investors and foreign brokers, accountants, lawyers or other 
professionals permits greater flow of information than otherwise. This 
decreases indirect barriers to investment.  
The number of short term travellers between countries is important for 
similar reasons. Although a proportion of bilateral short term travellers 
will be due to holiday makers, a significant amount would be 
businesspersons attending international meetings or conferences. 
Corresponding in person in relation to information regarding investment 
can also reduce information costs and indirect barriers to investment. 
Moreover travelling to another country can cultivate a sense of cultural 
familiarity.  
Results also suggest that investors are willing to hold equity portfolios in 
and be less biased against countries where the judicial system is 
recognised as being efficient. The efficiency of the judicial system index is 
taken to represent investors’ assessments of the efficiency and integrity 
of the legal environment as it affects business. A transparent and efficient 
court system that enforces contracts is likely to provide a better 
protection of investors’ rights and enhance the country’s investment 
climate.  
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Distance is found to be important for the determination of equity holdings. 
Despite the unique isolated location of Australia, the results suggest that 
Australian investors exhibit a preference for nearby countries once market 
size is taken into consideration. This supports the use of distance as a 
proxy for indirect transaction costs and information flow. Countries that 
are geographically near to each other have better information about each 
other due to trade, business and tourism linkages, common languages 
and media coverage. These findings are consistent with the findings of 
Portes, Rey & Oh (2001).  
Overall the results indicate that the legal environment and information 
costs have an impact on cross border equity holdings. Investors do not 
appear to take into account diversification incentives and the presence of 
capital controls when making investment decisions. This thesis finds that 
the asymmetries in information between domestic and foreign investors 
are of primary importance. 
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APPENDIX: DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES 
Equity Holdings: Australian holdings in foreign equities  
measured in millions of US dollars are available from  
the IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/pi/datarsl.htm. Equity holdings were 
converted into Australian dollars using  
daily exchange rate data from the RBA available at 
http://www.rba.gov.au/Statistics/exchange_rates.html.  
Equity Home Bias: The measure for equity home bias was calculated as 
1 minus the ratio of the share of country j equities at the domestic level 
over the share of country j equities at the global level.  The share of 
equities from the Australian portfolio was calculated using CPIS data. The 
share in the global portfolio was calculated from year end market 
capitalisation data available from DataStream. 
Market Capitalisation: Market capitalisation was calculated as the value 
of outstanding stock in millions of Australian dollars at year end. Source: 
DataStream. 
Reward to Risk: This measure is in accordance with Ahearne et al 
(2004) and is the mean daily return over the standard deviation of daily 
returns. Returns are measured as the daily changes in the country’s stock 
market index over the previous 12 months. Country indices are specified 
in Table 3. Data was obtained from DataStream.  
Correlation: Correlation between Australia and another country for a 
given year was calculated using the country indices specified in Table 3 
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and data was obtained from DataStream. It is measured as the 
correlation coefficient over the previous 12 months. 
Capital Controls: This measure is based in the IMF’s Annual report 
 on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER) 
 for the year 2000, as used by Miniane (2004). Values are  
missing for China and Poland. The dataset is freely available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/staffp/2004/02/miniane.htm. 
Trade Share: Trade share is taken as the sum of country specific 
bilateral exports and imports over the value of total trade for the previous 
12 months multiplied by 100. Data is from the IMF’s Direction of Trade 
Statisics and is available from DataStream.  
Distance: Distance is measured as the number of kilometres between the 
capital city of country j and Canberra as calculated from 
http://www.indo.com/distance. 
Language: Language is a dummy variable taking the  
value of one if the corresponding country’s official language  
is English and zero otherwise. Language is taken from 
http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/. English 
speaking countries are United States, United Kingdom, New Zealand and 
Canada. 
Short Term Travellers: Short term travellers is the sum of short term 
foreign arrivals and short term resident departures to a specific country 
over the previous 12 months. The data source is the Australian Bureau of 
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Statistics (ABS); Catalogue number 3401.0, Table’s 5 and 9. Data is also 
available from DataStream. 
Efficiency of the Judicial System: This variable is developed by the 
country risk rating agency Business International Corporation (BIC) and 
taken from La Porta et al (1998). This variable ranges from 0 to 10, 
where lower values denote lower levels of efficiency, and is the average 
between 1980 and 1983. Data is missing for Poland. 
Rule of Law: This variable is developed by BIC and taken from La Porta 
wt al (1998). It ranges from 0 to 10 with lower values representing less 
law and order and is the average of the months of April and October of 
the monthly index between 1982 and 1995. Values for Poland are 
missing.  
Accounting Standards: A rating on accounting standards, available from 
La Porta et al (1998) is created by the International Accounting and 
Auditing Trends. It is for 1990 and ranges from 0 to 100. 
Legal Origin:  A series of 4 dummy variables corresponding with UK, 
French, German and Scandinavian legal origin. Data is available from La 
Porta (2002) 
 61 
REFERENCES 
 
Ahearne, A.G., Griever, W.L. and Warnock, F.E. (2004) ‘Information Costs 
and Home Bias: an analysis of US holdings of foreign equities’, Journal of 
International Economics, Vol. 62, pp. 313-336. 
Backus, D.K., Kehoe, P.J., Kydland, F.E. (1992) ‘International Real 
Business Cycles’, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 100(4), pp. 745-775. 
Baxter, M. and Jermann, U.J. (1997) ‘The International Diversification 
Puzzle is worse than you think’, American Economic Review, Vol. 87(1), 
pp. 170-180. 
Black, F. (1974) ‘International Capital Market Equilibrium with Investment 
Barriers’, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 1(4), pp. 337-352. 
Choe, H., Kho, B. and Stulz, R.M. (2001) ‘Do Domestic Investors have 
more Valuable Information about Individual Stocks than Foreign 
Investors?’, NBER Working Paper 8073, NBER, Cambridge MA.  
Dahlquist, M., Pinkowitz, L., Stulz, R.M. and Williamson, R. (2003) 
‘Corporate Governance and the Home Bias’, Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 38, pp. 87-110. 
Faruqee, H., Li, S. and Yan, I.K. (2004) ‘The Determinants of 
International Portfolio Holdings and Home Bias’, IMF Working Paper 
04/34, International Monetary Fund; Washington. 
 62 
French, K.R. and Poterba, J.M. (1991) ‘Investor Diversification and 
International Equity Markets’, American Economic Review, Vol. 81(2), 
pp. 222-226. 
Gehrig, T. (1993) ‘An Information Based Explanation of the Domestic Bias 
in International Equity Investment’, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 
Vol. 95(1), pp. 97-109. 
Grinblatt, M. and Keloharju, M. (2001) ‘How Distance, Language and 
Culture Influence Stockholdings and Trades’ The Journal of Finance, Vol. 
56(3), pp. 1053-1073. 
Hasan, I. and Simaan, Y. (2000) ‘A Rational Explanation for Home 
Country Bias’, Journal of International Money and Finance, Vol. 19(3), pp. 
331-361. 
Hau, H. (2001) ‘Location Matters’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 56, pp. 1959-
1983. 
Kang, J. and Stulz, R.M. (1997) ‘Why is there a Home Bias? An Analysis of 
Foreign Portfolio Equity Ownership in Japan’, Journal of Financial 
Economics, Vol. 46(1), pp. 3-28. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Schleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W. (2002) 
‘Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 
57(3), pp. 1147-1170. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W. (1998) 
‘Law and Finance’, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 106(6), pp. 1113-
1155. 
 63 
Lane, P.R. (2000) ‘International Investment Positions: a Cross-sectional 
Analysis’, Journal of International Money and Finance, Vol. 19(4), pp. 
513-534. 
Lewis, K.K. (1999) ‘Trying to Explain Home Bias in Equities and 
Consumption’, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 37, pp. 571-608. 
Lintner, J. (1965) ‘The Valuation of Risky Assets and the Selection of 
Risky Investment in Stock Portfolio and Capital Budgets’, Review of 
Economics and Statistics, Vol. 47, pp. 103-124. 
Markowitz, H. (1952) ’Portfolio Selection’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 7(1), 
pp. 77-91. 
Martin, P. and Rey, H. (2004) ‘Financial Super-Markets: Size matters for 
Asset Trade’, Journal of International Economics, Vol. 64, pp. 335-361. 
Miniane, J. (2004) ‘A New set of Measures on Capital Account 
Restrictions’, IMF Staff Papers 51(2), International Monetary Fund; 
Washington. 
Mishra, A. and Daly, K. (2006) ‘Where do Australians Invest?’, The 
Australian Economic Review, Vol. 39(1), pp. 47-59. 
Portes, R., Rey, H. and Oh, Y. (2001) ‘Information and Capital Flows: The 
Determinants of Transactions in Financial Assets’, European Economic 
Review, Vol. 45, pp. 783-796. 
Sharpe, W. (1964) ‘Capital asset prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium 
under the condition of Risk’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 19, pp. 425-442. 
 64 
Tesar, L.L. and Werner, I.M. (1995) ‘Home Bias and High Turnover’, 
Journal of International Money and Finance, Vol. 14(4), pp. 467-492. 
Warnock, F. and Cleaver, C. (2003) ‘Financial Centres and the Geography 
of Capital Flows’, International Finance Discussion Papers No. 722, Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
 
 
 
